Extending the work of Davidson and Worrell, we further investigate the stock market''s reaction to announced corporate illegalities. We examine a sample of 535 announcements of corporate crime and obtain an overall insignificant stock market reaction. However, when the sample is divided by type of crime, we find that the stock market reacts significantly to announcements of bribery, tax evasion, and violations of government contracts. We also find a significantly negative reaction to announcements of corporate crime when the company had (...) been previously accused of other illegal activity. For companies accused of crime in the 1970s, 51% of them were accused again in the 1980s. (shrink)

In this article, we hypothesize that the level of environmentally oriented noncompliance regulatory fines and penalties levied on companies and on their industry counterparts will be associated with the development of an environmental infrastructure and practices within these companies. We find that the presence of these regulatory actions is associated with the likelihood of companies reporting environmental policies and activities and with the presence of a separate board of directors’ committee that monitors company environmental concerns. Our findings suggest that environmental (...) regulatory pressure may serve as a driver of environmental action but is not its only determinant. (shrink)